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John Rawls’s political liberalism has shaped contemporary political philosophy. 
Three other theories, feminism, republicanism, and communitarianism, devote a good 
deal of space to refuting Rawls’s theory, and claim to be superior alternatives to it.  My 
main thesis is that they are not alternatives to Rawls’s political liberalism but variations of 
it.  That is, although these theories present themselves as external critiques of liberalism, 
they are ultimately internal critiques, because their own theories are built upon the basic 
principles of liberalism.  This is not to deny that many of their criticisms are well-taken 
and thus need to be addressed by liberal theorists.  
I also argue that Rawls’s theory of political liberalism is in general terms correct. 
It needs however to be revised in other to solve what I take to be its main problem: Its 
lack  of  a  foundation.   In  my  dissertation  I  propose  a  revised  version  of  political 
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Rawls’s Political Liberalism and Its Foundation
1. Introduction
John  Rawls’s  liberalism  has  shaped  contemporary  political  philosophy. 
Liberalism is built upon the modern ideals of freedom and equality.1  Rawls’s liberalism 
was initially presented in A Theory of Justice, where it was developed as a comprehensive 
theory.2  While TJ’s liberalism proposed principles of justice that regulate what Rawls 
calls “society’s basic structure,” it was comprehensive insofar individuals were required 
to endorse this conception of justice as a doctrine that articulates their views about all 
aspects of the good life, not just political ones.  Later, however, Rawls changed the scope 
of his theory, thereby introducing significant modifications.  In PL Rawls’s theory is no 
longer comprehensive but strictly political.  Political liberalism is developed as an answer 
to  the  question “How is  it  possible  for  people  holding  different  and  irreconcilable 
comprehensive doctrines to live under one political regime which all of them consider 
legitimate?” (PL, 12).  Rawls argues that citizens converge on a political conception of 
justice that will govern their political life.  However, no agreement is necessary on how to 
lead a good life.  Rawls envisions a consensus that is strictly political and thus covers 
“constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.”  
In this chapter I want to present Rawls’s political liberalism.  I shall start by 
1 “a liberal conception combines and orders the two basic values of liberty and equality.” 
Rawls 1996.  The pages of this second introduction to Political Liberalism follow the first 
introduction in the 1993 edition, so I will refer to this as text simply as PL.
2 Rawls 1971 and 1999.  Hereafter referred to as TJ.  Page numbers refer to the revised 
edition.  I will only include the reference to the page numbers of the 1971 edition when it 
is necessary to emphasize the formulation as present in the original edition.  
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discussing Rawls’s transition from a comprehensive liberalism in TJ to a purely political 
one in PL.  I will show that, besides this transition, there is a second important transition 
in Rawls’s work.  After the publication of PL, he introduces modifications in his theory 
that  have  been  overlooked  by  political  philosophers.   I  shall  argue  that  these 
modifications reveal what I consider to be political liberalism’s main problem: Its lack of 
a foundation. 
The political conception on which citizens converge needs to be justified, and 
Rawls intentionally avoids doing so.  In PL he claims that the various comprehensive 
doctrines  citizens hold do not  need to  justify  the  political conception.  In  still  later 
writings there is an apparent change in his view for he maintains that comprehensive 
doctrines do justify the political conception.  However, as I shall also argue, political 
liberalism cannot  rely  on  the  fact  that  comprehensive doctrines justify  the  political 
conception.  It is in fact irrelevant whether they do that work or not.  An argument that is 
independent  of  the  various  comprehensive  doctrines  is  needed  to  ground  political 
liberalism’s conception of justice. 
The fact that according to political liberalism the conception of justice is not part 
of  any  comprehensive  doctrine  but  strictly  political,  leads  to  the  problem  of  the 
foundation of political liberalism.  Since Rawls’s comprehensive liberalism did not have 
this problem, one might wonder whether a return to a comprehensive theory is necessary 
in order to ground liberalism.  Such return would constitute the abandonment of purely 
political liberalism.  In my dissertation I shall argue that such return is not necessary.  I 
shall attempt to provide a foundation for a strictly political liberal theory.  
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2. From Comprehensive to Political Liberalism
2.1 A Theory of Justice’s Comprehensive Liberalism
In TJ Rawls proposes two principles of justice for which he offers a contractualist 
justification: Free and equal citizens would reasonably choose these principles of justice 
in a hypothetical situation –the “original position”— in which they do not know their 
position in society and hence might be the least-advantaged ones.  They are behind a “veil 
of ignorance,” which guarantees the fairness of the chosen principles.  The first principle 
calls for the most extensive equal basic liberties, while the second principle prescribes 
that inequalities should be arranged so that they provide the greatest benefit for the least 
advantaged.  
Rawls’s  theory  of  justice  understands  justice  as  “the  first  virtue  of  social 
institutions” (TJ 3).  While he acknowledges that we call persons and actions “just,” he 
emphasizes that his theory is about “social justice” (TJ 6).  The primary subject of justice 
is what Rawls calls “the basic structure of society,” that is, “the way in which the major 
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation” (TJ 6).  These major institutions are the political 
constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements.  The basic structure of 
society considers them together as a scheme (TJ 6).3 
The primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society because of the 
profundity  and  pervasiveness of  its  effects.   This  structure  contains  various  social 
positions. Being born in a particular position determines in part one’s life prospects. 
3 That is, not merely as a list of institutions that are each of them internally regulated by 
the principles of justice. See Lloyd 1995, 1331; and Nussbaum 2003, 503.  More on this 
in the chapter on Feminism. 
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There is deep inequality among these positions: Some are favored by society while others 
are not.  More importantly, although these positions notoriously affect our initial chances 
in life, “they cannot possibly be justified by an appeal to the notions of merit and desert” 
(TJ 7).  Nobody can possibly claim that he did anything to deserve to be born, say, as a 
healthy white male in a rich and well-educated family. 
Rawls explicitly assumes for the sake of the theory that society is “well-ordered”: 
a “society in which (1) everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same 
principles of justice, and (2) the basic institutions generally satisfy and are generally 
known as to satisfy these principles” (TJ 4).   Although society is  well-ordered, it  is 
characterized by both an identity and a conflict of interests.  Principles of justice are 
therefore needed to provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions 
of society (TJ 4).  
According to utilitarianism, the dominant theory before the publication of TJ, the 
benefits and burdens in society should be distributed in a way that maximizes the general 
utility.  Rawls presents his theory as an alternative to utilitarianism (TJ 20).  The benefits 
and burdens in society should be distributed according to principles of justice that are the 
object  of  an  agreement.   Utilitarianism  violates  considerations  of  justice,  Rawls 
maintains, because it does not take seriously the differences between persons (TJ 24).  It 
is certainly true that each individual tries to maximize her net balance of satisfaction, 
imposing a sacrifice on herself now for the sake of a greater advantage later.  Yet we are 
not justified to apply the utilitarian principle to society as a whole: Why should Ann 
sacrifice herself for something Beth will enjoy?  For utilitarianism the way the sum of 
satisfactions is distributed is not relevant; the correct distribution is the one that yields 
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maximum net sum of satisfactions.  To that extent it conflates all persons into one.
More importantly,  Rawls adds,  “there is  no reason in principle why (…) the 
violation of the liberty of a few might not be made right by the greater good shared by 
many” (TJ 23).  According to Rawls, 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of 
society as a whole cannot override.  For this reason justice denies that the loss of 
freedom for  some  is  made  right  by  a  greater  good  shared  by  others.  (…) 
Therefore in a just society (…) the rights secured by justice are not subject to 
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests (TJ 3-4).
The principles of  justice result  from a  hypothetical  contract.  Citizens would 
accept them in a well-defined initial situation, which Rawls calls the “original position.” 
The original position is the strictly hypothetical situation in which citizens agree on the 
principles of justice.  In the original position citizens are behind a “veil of ignorance,” 
that is, they do not know their own position in society and hence might be the least 
advantaged ones.  The veil of ignorance is needed in order to guarantee fairness –thus the 
name of “justice as fairness.”  Since citizens do not know their own position in society 
they cannot tailor the principles of justice to their own convenience.  
Yet Rawls does not stipulate that citizens have absolutely no knowledge behind 
the veil of ignorance.  Whereas citizens do not know their own socio-economic situation, 
race,  gender,  natural  talents,  mental  and  physical  abilities,  religion,  education, 
philosophical views, or family background, they do have some relevant information about 
society which they need in order to choose principles of justice.  They know what the 
“primary goods” are, that is, things that every person would rather have more than less of, 
no matter what her plan of life is.  Social primary goods (also called “chief primary 
goods”) include wealth, liberties, rights, and opportunities.  Intelligence, health, strength, 
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and imagination count as natural primary goods (TJ 54).
In the original position citizens act rationally and mutually disinterestedly.  They 
choose  what  is  rationally  best  for  themselves  and  they  are  not  required  to  act 
altruistically.   The  requirement  that  parties  in  the  original  position  act  mutually 
disinterestedly merely stipulates that they are conceived as not taking an interest in one 
another’s interests.4  The requirement that they act rationally demands that they take the 
most effective means to their ends.  
Free and equal citizens would reasonably choose two following principles of 
justice under this condition.  The first principle calls for the most extensive equal basic 
liberties:  “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible 
with a similar liberty for others” (TJ 60).  The second principle states that “[s]ocial and 
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected 
benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (TJ 72). 
The first principle is prior to the second, which means that no violation of basic 
liberties is justified in order to bring about greater socio-economic equality.  The second 
principle is however necessary in order to guarantee that basic liberties are not merely 
formal, but can be effectively exercised by individuals.  The second principle (specifically 
what concerns (a) in the formulation above) is called the “difference principle.”  It is 
4 “They are to presume that even their spiritual aims may be opposed, in the way that 
the aims of those of different religions may be opposed” (TJ 12).  Rawls specifies that 
requiring parties not to be altruistic does not mean that they are egoistic either, “that is, 
individuals with only certain kinds of interests, say in wealth, prestige, and domination” 
(TJ 12).  While this might be an odd understanding of ‘egoism,’ it can be said in Rawls’s 
defense that ‘altruistic’ and ‘egoistic’ are contraries, not contradictories.  Not being altru-
istic is therefore not equivalent to being egoistic.  
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meant to mitigate the impact of the “natural lottery,” that is, to compensate for the natural 
and social contingencies for which individuals should neither be rewarded nor penalized. 
While it is not a principle of redress, for it will not possibly compensate for any inequality 
in society, it achieves some of the intent of a principle of redress insofar as it meets the 
arbitrariness of fortune (TJ 87).
Rawls repeatedly emphasizes that the difference principle is a principle of mutual 
benefit.  It is not supposed to benefit exclusively the worst-off but everybody in society.5 
Thus  it  “expresses a  conception  of  reciprocity” (TJ  88).   Further,  “it  provides  an 
interpretation of the principle of fraternity” (TJ 90).  Fraternity, Rawls adds, implies “a 
sense of civic friendship and social solidarity” (TJ 90), which complement Rawls’s claim 
that “the difference principle represents (…) an agreement to regard the distribution of 
natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to share in the greater social and 
economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution” (TJ 87, 
my italics).
2.2 The Problem of Stability 







6 In PL Rawls specifies that in the well-ordered society, first, “everyone accepts, and 
knows that everybody else accepts, the very same principles of justice;” second, “its basic 
structure is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to satisfy these principles;” and 
third, “its citizens have a normally effective sense of justice so that they generally comply 
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of a well-ordered society as it appears in TJ is unrealistic (PL xvi).  On the one hand, all 
the citizens of a well-ordered society endorse the principles of justice on the basis of what 
Rawls calls a “comprehensive doctrine,” which articulates all their moral, religious, and 
philosophical  ideas..7  However,  modern democratic societies  are  characterized  by  a 
pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. That is, such a well-
ordered society in which citizens agree not only about principles of justice but also about 
their view of a “good life,” is inconsistent with the fact of pluralism.  On the other hand, a 
well-ordered society is a “highly idealized concept” (PL 35) “because it [the well-ordered 
society] is  inconsistent  with  realizing its  own  principles  under  the  best  foreseeable 
conditions” (PL xvii). 
As a solution,  Rawls introduces important changes in PL.   He moves from a 
comprehensive conception  of  justice,  to  a  strictly  political one.   Accordingly, he 
introduces  the  idea  of  an  overlapping  consensus  between  a  freestanding  political 
conception of justice and reasonable comprehensive doctrines, which is meant to render 
his theory of justice applicable in real life.  Rawls thus claims that a society that is well-
ordered by a political conception of justice is thus not utopian but workable.  He refers to 
the problem of the realization of theory as “the problem of stability.”8  
The problem of the realization of his theory of justice, which constitutes Rawls’s 
with society’s basic institutions.” (PL 35)
7 A comprehensive doctrine “includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and 
ideals of personal character, as well of ideals of friendship and of familial and associa-
tional relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our 
life as a whole” (PL 13).  More on this in the next section.  
8 The concern with stability was already present in TJ, although it did not receive much 
attention.  Stability involved “the acquisition of the sense of justice by the members of a 
well-ordered society” (TJ 397),  and “the question of congruence, that is,  whether the 
sense of justice coheres with the conception of our good so that both work together to 
uphold a just scheme” (TJ 397). 
8
main concern in PL, is distinguished from the justification of the theory.  He refers to 
these as conforming to two different “stages.”  The first one contains the justification of 
principles of justice, that is, the properly normative aspects of the theory: “This first stage 
gives the principles of justice that specify the fair terms of cooperation among citizens 
and  specify  when  a  society’s basic  institutions  are  just”  (PL  133).   Certainly,  the 
principles of justice need to be on hand in order to see whether they are realizable or not.
In  the  second  stage  Rawls  deals  with  the  practical problems related  to  the 
application or realization of the theory, that is, to the question of whether the theory is 
“stable”  or  not.  “The  second  stage  (…)  considers  how the  well-ordered democratic 
society of justice and fairness may establish and preserve unity and stability given the 
reasonable pluralism characteristic of it” (PL 133-134). He adds, “the problem of stability 
for a  democratic society requires that its political conception can be the focus of  an 
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines that can support a constitutional regime” 
(PL 65).  Besides the overlapping consensus, stability involves also questions of moral 
psychology: Whether citizens growing up within a just society will acquire the sense of 
justice necessary to comply with the principles of justice (PL 141).
In PL Rawls does not abandon his theory of justice as fairness but merely reduces 
its  scope.9  The  political  conception  that  constitutes  the  focus  of  the  overlapping 




10 Rawls certainly considers the possibility that the focus of the overlapping consensus be 
less specific: “a class of liberal conceptions that vary within a certain more or less narrow 
range” (PL 164).  He however considers justice as fairness the standard example for the 
political conception of justice (PL 164).  See also PL 167-8.
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constitute  the  political  conception  of  justice  were  certainly applied  at  the  level  of 
society’s basic structure.  However, in TJ it was presupposed that citizens endorse this 
conception of justice as a comprehensive doctrine that articulates their views about the 
good life.  Thus TJ is a theory of comprehensive liberalism.  In PL Rawls proposes that 
citizens might endorse the conception of justice for political issues without necessarily 
endorsing it for the non-political aspects of their life.
3. Political Liberalism 
3.1 The Overlapping Consensus 
In PL Rawls proposes that the political conception of justice is “freestanding,” 
that is, not presented as derived from, or as part of, any of the “comprehensive doctrines” 
that  articulate  the  citizens’  various  moral,  religious,  and  philosophical  ideas.  A 
comprehensive doctrine “includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and 
ideals  of  personal  character,  as  well  of  ideals  of  friendship  and  of  familial  and 
associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to 
our life as a whole” (PL 13).  Comprehensive doctrines are not necessarily personal but 
often social.  They are frequently based on religious or philosophical views that are not 
strictly personal, although they admit personal variations.
Rawls argues for an “overlapping consensus” on the political conception of justice 
among these comprehensive doctrines.  As a result of this, Rawls’s political liberalism 
encompasses a distinction between the political realm –ruled by the political conception 
of justice— and the non-political realm –informed by various diverse comprehensive 
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doctrines.  This distinction makes it possible for Rawls to preserve freedom with respect 
to non-political issues that fall beyond the scope of justice, while still justifying legitimate 
political power regarding political matters.  Furthermore, it is because of this distinction 
that  Rawls’s liberalism is  political,  as  opposed  to  comprehensive.   In  order  to  be 
(politically) liberal, one is not required to hold any particular (liberal or otherwise) set of 
values to rule one’s non-political life.  Only commitment to a liberal political conception 
















Although the conception of justice is strictly political, it “is affirmed as a moral 
conception and citizens are ready to act from it on moral grounds” (PL 168).  Citizens 
support it for its own sake and on its own merits (PL 147-8).  The consensus is therefore 
stable.  An overlapping consensus is different from a modus vivendi.  In a modus vivendi 
there is only a social consensus that is founded on self- or group interests, or on the 
outcome of political bargaining.  In a modus vivendi the compromise is compelled by the 
circumstances, so stability is contingent on them (PL 147).  
An overlapping consensus is also distinguished from a constitutional consensus. 
In a constitutional consensus citizens accept the principles of  the liberal  constitution. 
This consensus is,  however, fairly general.   It  does not have the depth,  breadth, and 
specificity of an overlapping consensus (PL 164).  An overlapping consensus is deeper 
than a constitutional consensus because it “requires its political principles and ideals be 
founded on a political conception of justice which includes ideas that uses fundamental 
ideas of society and person as illustrated by justice as fairness” (PL 164).  An overlapping 
consensus is broader than a constitutional consensus because it “goes beyond political 
principles  instituting democratic procedures  to  include principles  covering the  basic 
structure as a whole” (PL 164).  Finally, an overlapping consensus is more specific than a 
constitutional consensus because its focus is a particular conception of justice, which is 
elaborated from the central ideas of society as a  fair  system of  cooperation and the 




The political conception of justice that is the focus of the overlapping consensus 
yields  an  agreement  about  strictly  political  issues,  to  which  Rawls  refers  as 
“constitutional essentials and  questions of  basic  justice,”  that  is,  about  the  general 
structure of  the government and the political process, and the equal basic rights and 
liberties of citizens (PL 228).  This initial agreement is however insufficient to settle all 
fundamental  political  questions:  Such agreement  is  consistent with  a  broad range of 
alternatives.  First, the political conception is still fairly general and includes notions that 
are susceptible of being interpreted in different ways.  Second, in order to implement 
actual policies based on the political conception it is necessary to discern what they entail 
for  specific  cases  and  circumstances.   Third,  the  citizens’  different  comprehensive 
doctrines might result in conflicting interpretations of the political conception or even 
conflict with what the political conception itself stipulates.  The political conception thus 
needs  to  be  supplemented by  a  view  of  public  reason that  guides  public  political 
discussion.  
Citizens  honor  the  idea  of  public  reason when  they  bring  their  reason into 
agreement with that of others, thereby adopting a common point of view for settling the 
terms of their political life.14  When engaged in public reasoning, citizens cannot include 
reasons of their comprehensive doctrines but only of the political conception.  Non-public 
14 This does not mean to suggest that the political conception of justice always lead to 
the same conclusion, or that the satisfactory use of public reason necessarily guarantees 
agreement.  See Rawls 1997 (hereafter IPRR), 797-8.  In fact, the set of ideas and values 
that conform our public reason and thus are consistent with the liberal principles of justice 
are not necessary consistent among themselves.  They are ideas on which we can expect 
others to agree, and not ideas on which every citizen will necessarily agree.  They consti-
tute the basis of our political reasoning even if not all citizens will actually endorse all of 
them.  To that extent, they represent the scope of our democratic disagreement on funda-
mental political questions, while certainly not on all the non-political questions.
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reasons coming from our specific comprehensive doctrines have to be left aside because 
we cannot expect others to agree with them.  We can certainly engage in different types of 
discussion on fundamental political issues: Qua members of a cultural tradition, believers 
of a particular religion, or supporters of philosophical conceptions people do appeal to 
non-public reasons.   These  other  debates  mark  vigorous democracies and,  far  from 
meaning to impede them, public reason encourages them as long as they are pursued in 



























The public political forum, as also specified by Rawls, includes the discourses of 
judges  in  their  decisions  (especially  in  the  Supreme  Court),  government officials 
(especially chief executives and legislators), and candidates for public office and their 
campaign managers in their public political statements.16  Citizens can, however, also 
realize the ideal of public reason if they carry out the discussion of fundamental political 
questions as if they were legislators, who appeal only to shared ideas.17 
The  claim  that  the  comprehensive  doctrines  and  the  conception  of  justice 
constitute two distinct spheres, which grounds the overlapping consensus, is undoubtedly 
16 As explained in IPRR 767-8.
17 See IPRR 769.  Certainly, legislators might deal with issues that are not strictly politi-
cal in the Rawlsian sense, that is, that are not “constitutional essentials and matters of 
basic justice.”   Rawls refers to legislators to illustrate  how  public reason ought to be 
conducted, and not about which topics it applies.  
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the most disputed thesis of Rawls’s PL.  It certainly rests on a number of complex claims 
that need to be analyzed more carefully.  For instance, how can the spheres be distinct? 
To what extent are they related and why?  To what extent is the political conception 
freestanding?  What type of relationship(s) between the comprehensive doctrines and the 
political  conception  of  justice does an overlapping consensus stipulate?   In  order to 
answer  these  questions  it  is  necessary to  say  more  about  how the  liberal  political 
conception of justice constitutes the focus of the overlapping consensus.  To what are 
people who hold different comprehensive doctrines expected to agree within political 
liberalism?   What  characterizes  the  comprehensive  doctrines  that  overlap with  the 
political conception of justice?
3.2 The Reasonable 
The political conception of justice that Rawls is putting forward is not meant to 
overlap  with  all conceivable  comprehensive  doctrines  but  only  with  “reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.”  The notions of freedom and equality of all citizens, as well as 
the willingness to come up with fair terms of social cooperation, are characteristic of 
reasonable  comprehensive  doctrines.   Rawls  does  not  offer  a  precise  definition  of 
‘reasonable.’   In general,  he limits  himself to  presenting examples of  reasonable (or 
unreasonable)  comprehensive  doctrines.   Examples  of  unreasonable  comprehensive 
doctrines  are  doctrines that  deny the  equal  value of  each individual,  denying  some 
political rights to an ethnic or social group; or restrict the freedom of, say, women to 
participate in political issues; or attempt to use the state’s power and resources to advance 
one particular religious view.
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Yet  it  seems  that  a  more  precise  definition  of  ‘reasonable’  (as  well  as 
‘unreasonable’) is needed.18  It has however been suggested that ‘reasonable’ cannot be 
defined beforehand, but only revealed by its uses: “Rawls contends that proceeding in this 
way is necessary, since ‘the content of the reasonable’ can only be ‘specified by the 
content of a reasonable political conception’ of justice.”19  First, it is not clear to me why 
the latter prevents us from offering a more specific definition of the reasonable.  Second, 
it  seems to  me  that  spelling out  a  definition  for  the  ‘reasonable’  spotlights  some 
ambiguities that Rawls should have avoided.
Certainly, comprehensive doctrines that are considered reasonable are the ones 
that “fit” with the liberal conception of justice, that is, the ones with which conception of 
justice can overlap.  In more specific terms: A comprehensive doctrine is reasonable if 
and only if it can endorse the political conception of justice Rawls is putting forward. 
Furthermore,  persons  are  reasonable  if  and  only  if  they  only  affirm  reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines.  The liberal political conception of justice is thus the criteria to 
determine whether a comprehensive doctrine (or a person) is reasonable or not.20  Besides, 
conceptions of justice are also characterized as reasonable or not reasonable.  What makes 
a conception of justice reasonable?  Since comprehensive doctrines are reasonable if they 
endorse a liberal political conception of justice, it seems that conceptions of justice will 
be reasonable if they are politically liberal in the sense Rawls is putting forward.  If that is 
18 The ‘unreasonable’ is presented by Rawls as what is properly not reasonable.  This pair 
of contraries is systematically used as contradictories in PL.






the case, it is not clear why Rawls introduces the idea of the ‘reasonable,’ since it seems 
to do no more work than ‘liberal’ does.  Rawls’s claim that political liberalism provides 
“the  most reasonable conception of justice” (PL 95, my emphasis), suggests that only 
political liberalism is reasonable.  So it is helpful to clarify what is meant by politically 
liberal, for which it will be necessary to examine Rawls’s liberal political conception. 
In later writings Rawls characterizes the main features of reasonable political 
conceptions in the following way21:
First,  a  list  of  certain basic rights, liberties,  and  opportunities (such as  those 
familiar from constitutional regimes);
Second,  an  assignment  of  special  priority  to  those  rights,  liberties,  and 
opportunities,  especially with  respect to  the  claims of  the  general  good and 
perfectionist values; and
Third,  measures ensuring for all  citizens adequate  all-purpose means to make 
effective use of their freedoms (IPRR 774).22
For  political liberalism, the  commitment to  the  political conception of  justice  is  as 
essential as the citizen’s willingness to give priority to this conception when it conflicts 
with what their comprehensive doctrines stipulate.  In a nutshell, being politically liberal 
requires, first, holding the political conception and, second, committing oneself to what is 
referred to as “the priority of the right over the good.”







22  He  also  says   that   “the  basic   requirement   is   that  a   reasonable  doctrine  accepts  a 
constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.” (IPRR 766)
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Rawls states that “the priority of the right means that the principles of political 
justice impose limits on permissible ways of life, and hence the claims citizens make to 
pursue ends that transgress those limits have no weight” (PL 174).  This means that, on 
the one hand, some comprehensive doctrines or some particular actions stipulated by a 
comprehensive doctrine will be deemed as unacceptable (“unreasonable”23) and thus be 
prohibited.  Certainly, the political conception is meant to rule only our political life while 
the comprehensive doctrines rule our non-political life.   However,  since the political 
conception (“the right”) has priority over the different conceptions of the good embodied 
in  the  comprehensive  doctrines,  it  has  the  power  to  exclude certain  comprehensive 
doctrines even if citizens follow them only in the non-political realm.  In other words, 
John cannot enslave Ann in the private realm for it violates Ann’s basic rights.  The fact 
that the action occurs in the privacy of their home is irrelevant.  While the political 
conception is referred to as “neutral” with respect to comprehensive doctrines or ideas of 
the good, it is not neutral with respect to all of them, but only with respect to the ones that 
are acceptable from the perspective of the political conception. 
On the  other hand,  the priority of the right  over the good stipulates that  the 
political conception of justice expresses values that normally outweigh whatever other 









like  eternal   life  or  condemnation,  which  can  be  seen as  having priority  over  other 
everyday aspects of our existence.
Rawls adds, 
the history of religion and philosophy shows that there are many reasonable ways 
in which the wider realm of values can be understood so as to be either congruent 
with, or supportive of, or else not in conflict with, the values appropriate to the 








Says Rawls, “The values that conflict with the political conception of justice and 
its sustaining virtues may be normally outweighed because they come into conflict with 
the very conditions that make fair social cooperation possible on a footing of mutual 
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respect” (PL 157).  Indeed, a strictly political (as opposed to comprehensive) conception 
of justice was introduced because contemporary democratic societies are characterized by 
a  plurality  of  reasonable  comprehensive  doctrines  (what  Rawls  calls  “the  fact  of 
reasonable pluralism”).  A political conception of justice is adopted in order to avoid 
conflict among competing conceptions of the good in general thereby making a stable 
government possible.  The priority of the right over the good is a sort of corollary of 
adopting  the  political  conception  of  justice.   The  point  of  adopting  the  political 
conception is precisely to subordinate the competing conceptions of the good to it.  The 
whole purpose of  having a  political conception  of  justice is  to  justify subordinating 
comprehensive doctrines to it in a case of competing claims. 
This  argument might  be  trivial  but  is  not  thus  wrong.   It  might  however 
mistakenly suggest that there is a merely pragmatic reason supporting the priority of the 
right over the good, and ultimately, the political conception of justice that gives rise to 
such priority.  While this position is incompatible with Rawls’s claim that “the ideas of 
the domain of the political and a political conception of justice are normative and moral 
ideas are normative and moral ideas in their own right” (PL xxxviii), it is also suggested 
by other aspects of Rawls’s theory, which I will discuss in section 4 of this chapter.  
It is worth emphasizing that the idea of the priority of the right over the good does 
not imply that political liberalism does no presuppose  any  notion of the good.  Says 
Rawls, “This must be incorrect,  since the right and the good are complementary: no 
conception of justice can draw entirely upon one or the other, but must combine both in a 
definite way” (PL 173).   In  fact the political conception of justice incorporates five 
substantive ideas of the good: “a) the idea of goodness as rationality; b) the idea of 
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primary goods; c) the idea of permissible comprehensive conceptions of the good (those 
associated with comprehensive doctrines); d) the idea of the political virtues; and e) the 
idea of the good of the well ordered society” (PL 176).  The first two were already present 
in TJ.  These five ideas of the good constitute political values insofar they do not require 
the endorsement of any particular comprehensive doctrine.
3.4 The Relationship between the Political Conception and the Comprehensive 
Doctrines
The priority of the right over the good does not imply that there is no relationship 
between the conception of  justice and the comprehensive doctrines.  Rawls certainly 
introduces  the  political  conception  of  justice  as  a  freestanding  view,  that  is,  as 
independent from the comprehensive doctrines.  However, he indicates that there is some 
relationship between the comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice: 
“we clearly imply some relation between political and non-political values” (PL 138). 
“As an account of political values,” Rawls adds, “a freestanding political conception does 
not (…) say that political values are separate from, or discontinuous with, other values” 
(PL10).  More specifically, he adds that “citizens individually decide for themselves in 
what  way  the  public  political  conception  all  affirm  is  related  to  their  own  more 
comprehensive views” (PL 38).  The political conception is thus presented as a sort of 
module that fits into the comprehensive doctrines.24  Whether or not this implies that the 
24 “the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that in different 
ways fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 
endure in the society regulated by it” (PL 144-5, my emphasis).
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political conception of justice is or is not actually freestanding25, we can ask why Rawls 
thinks that there needs to be some type of relationship between the political and the non-
political sphere in the first place.  
Rawls maintains that the comprehensive doctrines can be a useful foundation for 
the political conception.  He claims that the political conception “can be supported by 
various reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (PL 12, my emphasis).  He adds, “While we 
want a  political  conception  to  have  a  justification  by  reference  to  one  or  more 
comprehensive doctrines, it is neither presented as, nor as derived from, such a doctrine 
applied to the basic structure of society” (PL12, my emphasis, too).  However, the key 
question is not whether such a political conception  can be supported, or whether we 
might desire such support, but whether that support is needed or not.  In other passages he 
states that “In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, 
each from its point of view” (PL 134); and “All those who affirm the political conception 
start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, 
and moral grounds it provides” (PL 147).26  It seems then that the political conception of 
justice needs to be supported by the different comprehensive doctrines.  Yet why is such 
support necessary?  
In  PL’s  first  lecture,  Rawls states that  citizens have  both  political and  non-
political aims and commitments, based on the political conception of justice and their 
comprehensive doctrines, respectively.  He adds, “These two kinds of commitments and 
25 I will explicitly discuss this issue later.
26 Rawls adds: “It is left to the citizens individually –as part of liberty of conscience— to 
settle how they think the values of the political domain are related to other values in their 
comprehensive doctrine” (PL 140).
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attachments –political and non-political— specify moral identity and give shape to a 
person’s life, what one sees oneself as doing and trying to accomplish in the social world” 
(PL 31).  Furthermore, he explicitly states that “These two aspects of their moral identity 
citizens must adjust and reconcile” (PL 31, my emphasis).  Thus, it is for the sake of the 
coherence of our moral identity that there should be some particular relationship between 
the political conception of justice and the comprehensive doctrines.  Yet this does not 
stipulate that the comprehensive doctrines need to offer support or justification to the 
political conception of justice, but merely that there is no conflict between both.
In fact, in PL’s fourth lecture, which is devoted to the overlapping consensus, 
Rawls considers three different ways in which the political conception of justice relates to 
comprehensive  doctrines:  “there  are  many  reasonable comprehensive  doctrines  that 
understand the wider realm of values to be (a) congruent with, or (b) supportive of, or else 
(c) not in conflict with, political values as these are specified by a political conception of 
justice for a democratic regime” (PL 169, my emphasis).27  Thus it is only required that 
the  comprehensive  doctrines be  compatible with  the  political conception:  “When  an 
overlapping consensus supports the political conception, this conception is not viewed as 
incompatible with  basic  religious,  philosophical,  and  moral  values”  (PL  157,  my 
emphasis).28
27. Also: ”the history of religion and philosophy shows that there are many reasonable 
ways in which the wider realm of values can be understood so as to be either (a) congru­
ent with, or (b) supportive of, or else (c) not in conflict with, the values appropriate to the 
special domain of the political conception of justice” (PL 140).
28 Also specified in the following passage: “many if not most citizens come to affirm the 
principles of justice incorporated into their constitution and political practice without see-
ing any particular connection, one way or another, between those principles and their oth-
er views” (PL 160).
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Yet Rawls seems to shift from this view (1) that stipulates only that the political 
conception should be  not incompatible with the comprehensive doctrines, and thus (a), 
(b), and (c) can be the case, to the view (2) that the comprehensive doctrines need to 
ground the  political conception,  making (b)  the  only possible  case,  as  suggested  in 
previous quotations.  If the latter is the case, it is not clear to what extent the political 
conception is  freestanding given that  it  does need to be grounded on comprehensive 
doctrines.  It seems that it can still be claimed that it is freestanding in the sense that it can 
be supported by arguments that are independent from the ones coming from particular 
comprehensive doctrines.  However, as I will show later, Rawls himself undermines this 
reading by refusing to present such arguments.  
4. The Foundation of Political Liberalism
4.1 Rawls’s Later Writings
In later writings this shift becomes evident.29  Rawls seems to ignore completely 
his  initial  position,  (1),  thus  making comprehensive doctrines  more important  to  his 
theory, at least apparently.30 He states: “the roots of democratic citizens’ allegiance to 
29 By later writings I mean the following: Rawls 1996 (referred to as Intro), IPRR, and 
Rawls 1999 (“Commonweal Interview with John Rawls,” in Collected Papers), hereafter 
CP. 
30 Several criticisms (mostly by feminist theorists) raised against PL focused on the fact 
that the distinction between political and moral views stipulated by Rawls was artificial, 
and, at any rate, highly problematic (see chapters on Feminist Theory and Communitari-
anism).  Probably motivated by this, Rawls tried to emphasize the ways in which the po-
litical conception and the comprehensive doctrines do relate, thereby shifting to the view 
in which the comprehensive doctrines positively ground the political conception, that is 
(2), instead of merely being not incompatible with it as in (1).  There is in fact no later 
mention of (a), (b), and (c) as possible ways in which comprehensive doctrines and the 
political conception relate to each other.
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these political conceptions lie in their respective comprehensive doctrines, both religious 
and nonreligious” (IPRR 784-5).
This  shift  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  Rawls  explicitly  moves,  after  the 
publication of PL, to an extended view of public reason.  In PL Rawls had argued that 
when engaged in public reasoning citizens cannot include reasons of their comprehensive 
doctrines but  only of  the political conception.   Yet  in  his  1996 “Introduction to the 
Paperback Edition of  Political  Liberalism,”  as well  as in later pieces, he revises that 
position and states that “reasonable such doctrines can be introduced in public reason at 
any time provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable conception, 
are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced 
to support” (Intro li-lii).  He refers to this as the proviso.31 
This  wide  view of  public reason presupposes a  greater  role  attributed  to  the 
comprehensive doctrines; they ground the political conception: “It is wise, then, for all 
sides to introduce their comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or secular, so as to 
open the way for them to explain to one another how their views do indeed support those 
basic  political values”  (IPRR 785,  my emphasis).32  Rawls explicitly states  that this 
addition  “has  the  further  advantage  of  showing  to  other  citizens  the  roots  in  our 
comprehensive  doctrines  of  our  allegiance  to  the  political  conception”  (Intro  lii).33 
However, it is not clear to what extent this is a substantive addition, since elements of 
comprehensive  doctrines can,  because  of  the  proviso,  only  be  introduced  qua ideas 
31 See also IPRR 776, and CP 619, as also quoted infra.  
32 “We may  think  of  the  reasonable  comprehensive doctrines  that  support society’s 
reasonable political conceptions as those conceptions’  vital social basis,  giving them 
enduring strength and vigor” (IPRR 785, my emphasis).
33 See also IPRR 784-5.
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supported by the political conception.  The mere fact that these ideas belong to particular 
comprehensive doctrine is thus not relevant.34  Therefore, comprehensive doctrines are 
only apparently being attributed a more important role.  In fact, they can be introduced 
into political discussion only if eventually they can be supported by public reasons.35 
Rawls  himself  acknowledges  that  “the  introduction  into  public  political  culture  of 
religious and secular doctrines, provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature 
and content of justification in public reason itself.  This justification is still given in terms 
of a family of reasonable political conceptions of justice” (IPRR, 784).  Whether this 
addition counts as a substantive modification of Rawls’s previous understanding of public 
reason or not, it does constitute evidence of a shift in which the political conception is 
grounded on the comprehensive doctrines. 
4.2 A Freestanding Conception?
There is something counterintuitive about the fact that the political conception is 
34 As also clear in the following fragment: “Any comprehensive doctrine, religious or sec-
ular, can be introduced into any political argument at any time, but I argue that people 
who do this should also present what they believe are public reasons for their argument. 
So their opinion is no longer that of one particular party, but an opinion that all members 
of a society might reasonably agree to, not necessarily that they would agree to.  What’s 
important is the people give the kinds of reasons that can be understood and appraised 
apart from their particular comprehensive doctrine” (CP 619, my emphasis).
35 This does not mean that people are legally prohibited from making religious arguments. 
By avoiding religious arguments citizens fulfill their duty of civility, which “like other 
political rights and duties, is  an intrinsically  moral duty” (IPRR 769,  my emphasis). 
Rawls specifies that it is not a legal duty for it would be incompatible with freedom of 
speech. He adds, “People can make arguments from the Bible if they want to.  But I want 
them to see that they should also give arguments that all reasonable citizens might agree 
to” (CP 620).  That means that citizens have also pragmatic reasons to avoid religious 
arguments given that others have no reason to agree with them. 
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grounded on various comprehensive doctrines, and yet citizens are expected not to appeal 
to them in public political discussions,  and even to subordinate them to the political 
conception whenever both conflict.  On the one hand, if the political conception is in fact 
grounded on comprehensive doctrines, it is not clear why they cannot be incorporated in 
public reason or why the political conception has priority over them.  On the other hand, 
if the political conception is truly freestanding, it is not clear why it should be argued for 
using premises from comprehensive doctrines.  If only arguments based on the political 
conception are  acceptable, it  seems that  an  argument for  such  conception  could be 
presented that is independent of particular comprehensive doctrines.  Doing so would 
show the political conception to be freestanding.  Certainly, the fact that there is  an 
independent argument for the political conception does not mean that there cannot be any 
other arguments (provided from the different comprehensive doctrines) that lead to it.  
However, Rawls explicitly refuses to provide such an independent argument for 
the political conception.  In PL, as well as in later writings, he explicitly claims to avoid 
such discussion.36  This position, which certainly is consistent with Rawls’s attempt at 
making the comprehensive doctrines more relevant within his theory, is inconsistent with 
the view that citizens cannot appeal to the doctrines that ground the political conception 
when engaging in public reasoning.  Precisely because they should limit themselves to the 
political conception, it is necessary for Rawls to clarify as much as possible the argument 
supporting it.  Yet, as I shall argue, Rawls’s refusal to offer an argument for the political 
36 In CP 621-2 Rawls states: “Citizens can have their own grounding [for a liberal politi-
cal conception] in their comprehensive doctrines, whatever they happen to be.  I make a 
point in Political Liberalism of really not discussing anything, as far as I can help it, that 
will put me at odds with any theologian, or any philosopher.”
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conception is highly problematic for reasons other than this inconsistency.
Why does Rawls refuse to ground the political conception on arguments other 
than the ones coming from the various particular comprehensive doctrines?  “I don’t 
really need them and they would cause division from the start,” he states (CP 621).  This 
“practical” reason coheres with his main concern, in PL, of working on a theory that, 
unlike the one in TJ, is  not utopian but whose principle are realizable,  and properly 
focusing on the  realization –rather than on  the  justification— of  the  theory.  In  PL 
Rawls’s focus is the application or realization of the theory.  He thus refuses to provide an 
argument for the political conception of justice and relies on the various comprehensive 
doctrines for that sake.  The political conception itself is taken for granted in order to 
focus on the stability, which is seen as possible given the distinction between the two 
stages.
4.3 The Problem of Foundation
Although Rawls claims that  the justification  and the  realization of  the theory 
constitute different stages, it is not clear to what extent this is true.  It has been observed, 
mainly by Jürgen Habermas, that this distinction is not just artificial, but mistaken.37  For 
instance, it seems that issues that Rawls claims belong to the second stage, such as the 
overlapping consensus (PL 65), in fact seem to be essential to the first stage, to what 
properly constitutes the “theory.”  The same can be said about the complex notion of “the 
reasonable” which according to Rawls also belongs to the second stage, that is, to the 
realizability of the theory.  However, if the overlapping consensus and the concept of the 
37 Habermas 1995.  Also included, with Rawls’s reply to it, in the 1996 edition of PL.
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“reasonable” are not elements of the justification of the theory but of its application, it 
could  be  questioned to  what  extent  they  can  be  used  to  refute  other  theoretical 
approaches, for instance, showing that political liberalism rejects sexist or discriminatory 
comprehensive doctrines because they are unreasonable.  It is certainly not obvious that 
the realization and thus the stability of the theory should be seen as independent from its 
justification.  If Rawls claims that these do belong to two different stages, then, first, it 
seems that the burden of the proof is on him.  Second, it is clear that a modified version of 
his theory that can achieve the same goal without introducing such disputed distinction is 
preferable.   
I want to argue that it makes more sense to relate the realization of the theory to 
its justification.  That means denying the distinction (between stages) that allows Rawls to 
avoid providing a justification for the political conception.  Such justification would be 
needed because Rawls specifies that he is interested in not just stability, but “stability for 
the right  reasons,  that  is,  as  secured  by a  firm allegiance to  a  democratic society’s 
political  (moral)  ideals  and  values” (IPRR 781).   The  best  way to  guarantee  such 
“stability for the right reasons” is by providing a clear, explicit, and sound argument for 
the  liberal  political  conception  that  people  would  agree  on,  no  matter  what  their 
comprehensive doctrines are.  Since as the focus of an overlapping consensus the political 
conception is a view that is reasonable for all people, it seems rather obvious that it 
should be  possible  to  provide an  argument for  it  that  does not  rely on  the  various 
comprehensive doctrines.  Since the political conception of justice is presented by Rawls 
as a  normative and moral idea  in  its  own right and that has  its  intrinsic own ideal, 
principles, and standards (Intro xxxviii, xliv), it seems that it should be possible to justify 
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it using premises that are independent from the particular comprehensive doctrines and 
thus acceptable to all.   Although Rawls often wants to attribute central importance to 





ing to secure.38   If the political conception is meant to be the object of a  principled  




because there is  (at  least one) good argument for constitutional  democracy, and not 
merely because it is good to perpetuate whatever political conception or regime citizens 
happen to agree on.39  Yet Rawls acknowledges in CP 620­1 that he gives historical and 
38 I am not thereby objecting that we merely have what Rawls calls a modus vivendi as op-
posed to an overlapping consensus, because people can wholeheartedly agree on a con-
ception that is normatively wrong, as opposed to just merely tolerate it for the sake of 
convenience as in a modus vivendi (see PL 147). 
39 Further, it seems that such argument is particularly necessary given that Rawls himself 
repeatedly states that “a diversity of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral com-
prehensive doctrines found in democratic societies is a permanent feature of the public 






Ultimately, what role do comprehensive doctrines play within political liberalism? 
They seem to be fifth wheels.  It is imperative to develop an argument for the political 
conception that is clearly independent from the various comprehensive doctrines.  Such 
an argument cannot be taken for granted or avoided simply because one wants to focus on 
the realization of liberalism, as opposed to its justification.  It should appeal to universal 
facts about human nature –humans are free and equal— and not be grounded on any 
particular comprehensive doctrines.   Whether comprehensive doctrines  coincide with 
such  an  argument, or  provide  a  different  argument for  the  political  conception  is 
irrelevant.  Stability for the right reasons will be guaranteed if there is an argument for a 
truly freestanding political conception of justice.  Therefore, comprehensive doctrines are 
merely expected not to be incompatible with the political conception of justice instead of 
to ground such conception.
Hence,  what  is  relevant  for  political  liberalism is  certainly not  the  fact  that 
comprehensive  doctrines  ground  the  political  conception  of  justice,  but  rather  the 
particular content of that political conception and the scope of the conception, that is, 
what makes it liberal, and what makes it political, respectively.  The content is the idea 
that all people are equal and have equal right to freedom.  From this content their basic 
rights can be derived.  The scope is the political, which is the realm governed by this 









of   the   liberal  project.    What   is   it   about  political   liberalism  that   is  problematic   for 
feminist   theory   and   why?     Can   feminist   theory   in   fact   “do   away”   with   political 
liberalism, as is continuously suggested?    











































allegedly   supported   by   Rawls’s   liberalism,   has   understandably   infuriated  most 
feminists. 










comprehensive  doctrines   in  political   liberalism’s  scheme.    As   I   already  mentioned, 
Rawls   argues   that   the   liberal   political   conception   of   justice   only   overlaps   with 
“reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”   Hence if it can be claimed that sexist views 
constitute   unreasonable   comprehensive   doctrines,   they   have   no   place   in   a   liberal 






since   sexism endorses   gender  inequality,   it   is   unreasonable.    According   to  Sharon 
Lloyd, for a doctrine to be unreasonable it needs to use the state’s power to deprive 




















appeal   to   justice   in   that   realm,   inequality   is   at   the  very   root   of   the  public/private 
distinction.  The fact that there is such a distinction is problematic for women, not for 








Put   in   other   terms,   if   we   accept   Rawls’s   private/public   distinction,   and  his 
consequent claim that justice only applies to the public realm, it seems that we cannot 
claim that there is injustice in the private sphere.   There cannot be (political) injustice 














in   some   sense  part  of   society’s  basic   structure,  which   is   regulated  by   the  political 
conception of justice (PL 258, TJ 7).  Rawls’s rationale for including the “nature of the 
family” within the basic structure of society is that institutions belonging to the latter 
“have   deep   and   long­term   social   effects   and   in   fundamental   ways   shape   citizen’s 
character  and aims, the kinds of persons they are and aspire  to be” (PL 68).    Thus 




personal  relationships.   Some feminists have argued that  justice requires equal legal 
entitlement to all the earnings coming into the household.  Susan  Okin, in particular, 
proposed having employers make out wage checks equally divided between the earner 
and the partner that provides the unpaid domestic services (1989, 180-1).  Yet this is 
problematic for a number of reasons.  Consider this: The wife gets sick and has to pay 
exorbitant medical bills.  Her (just) share to her husband’s wage check is insufficient to 
pay for those bills.  Should not her husband still pay for her medical bills?  Would Okin 
say that, since the wife is entitled to half of the earnings, only that much should be spent 
in her medical bills?  I do not think so.  It is reasonable to expect the husband to assume 
this responsibility out of love and care, disregarding whether this action is consistent with 
a just division of wage checks.  Justice seems to be insufficient compared with love and 
care.   However,  a weaker  claim can be made, namely that  love and care produce a 
behavior that is at least as good as the behavior caused by justice.  John might do half the 
housework but not because he thinks it is just, but purely out of love and care for Anne.




















thereby not  imposing a  just  feminist  doctrine within the family realm, but “merely” 










































A   careful   examination   of   the  relationship  between   the   two   spheres   (which 
constitutes a vague point in Rawls’s PL) is needed.  An analysis of social, cultural, and 
economic  practices   is   required   to   redraw  the  boundaries   between   the   two   spheres. 
Redrawing the boundaries does not mean obliterating them.  It is in the best interest of 















Furthermore,   if   “private”   is   understood   as   the   personal,   the   distinction   is 
indispensable for the feminist agenda.  Feminists want ultimately to protect this view of 
privacy   but   not   in   the   traditional   familiar   sense,   that   is,   not   as   the   space   of   the 
traditional   heterosexual   family   in  which  women  have  been  generally   subordinated. 









realm.     Feminist   arguments   with   respect   to   abortion   and   reproductive   matters,   in 
general,   clearly   illustrate   this  claim.    Their  position   thus  coincides  with   the   liberal 








pornography.     On   the   other   hand,   the   feminist   commitment   to   the   protection   of 












argument   for   the  government   stepping   in   uses   premises   that   the   argument   for   the 
government stepping out rejects.    If  one argument is  sound,  then the other must be 
unsound.   It is not clear what feminists think the relationship between the private and 
the political  should be.   Therefore,  it  may be very difficult   to accommodate all  the 
feminist claims within political liberalism.  Even if “the personal is political” asks for 
the extension of a principle cherished by liberalism —equality— that same extension 




the   public/private   distinction,   give   more   information   about   how   to   retrace   the 





life  and activity   that  any person has   the  right   to  exclude  others   from.    The 
private   in   this   sense   is   not   what   public   institutions   exclude,   but   what   the 
46
individual   chooses   to   withdraw   from   public   view   (1990,   119­120;   my 
emphasis).55
Clearly  along with   liberalism,  she  explains   that  “[t]he  purpose  of  protecting 
privacy   is   to  preserve   liberties  of  individual  action,  opportunity,   and  participation” 
(1990, 121; her emphasis).    She further adds: “The feminist  slogan ‘the personal  is 
political’ expresses the principle that no social practices or activities should be excluded 





















brought  to  political  discussion,  for  they are not properly political   issues.    Domestic 
violence and sexual assault of women have been made public political issues certainly 
not because they are arbitrary topics which women had the freedom to share within an 
open   socially   public   discussion   but   because   they   clearly   constitute   cases   in  which 


































In   contrast,   an   ethics   of   care   is   concerned   with   particular   relationships, 
solidarity, and responsiveness to particular needs.  This approach is perfectly consistent 
with the features of “maternal thinking” proposed by Sara Ruddick (1989).  Care ethics 
relies   on   an   empathetic,   affective,   and   intuitive   self  who   is   embedded   in   concrete 
narratives –as opposed to a universally valid, abstract theory.  Her ability for contextual 
moral judgment allows for recognition of a plurality of unequal capabilities that call for 
specific   care  and  attention.    Benhabib  has  called   the  care   ethics   self   the  “concrete 
other,” as opposed to the liberal and modern “generalized other.”  Consistent with most 
feminist views, she also acknowledges that the features of the “generalized other” have 






respect,  duty,  worthiness,  and dignity;  whereas  the standpoint of   the concrete other 
corresponds  to  the feelings of   love,  care,  sympathy,  and solidarity  (Benhabib 1997, 
744).     Furthermore,   from   the   care   ethics   perspective   it   is   not   merely   objective 





































baum has  also  highlighted  (2003,  491­3  and 496).    Susan  Okin  acknowledges   that 
“those aspects of Rawls’s theory, such as the difference principle, that seem to require a 
greater capacity  to  identify with others  than is normally characteristic  of liberalism, 
might be strengthened by reference to conceptions of relations between self and others 
that seem in a gendered society to be more predominantly female” (1987, 71).


















my goal   is  not   to  prescribe a  moral  and political   theory consonant  with   the 











modifications  in it,   that is,  developing a sort of “better liberalism,” for which many 
















status  is   always   undermined.   (…)  Equal  parenting   and  equal  
65 See Munoz­Dardé 1998 for further criticisms of care ethics.
54










problem”   of   liberalism,   she   seems   to   distinguish   those   realms   pretty   well   in   her 
preliminary account of the alleged non­liberal theory (1987, 121).  Like most feminists, 
she certainly avoids the liberal language of universal principles in favor of particularity. 
66 However, as I suggested in the previous section, it seems that equality –like justice— is 
insufficient to depict desirable personal relationships.  I do not expect mere equality in a 
love  relationship,  for  instance.   Moreover,  equality  can  be  inappropriate  in  certain 
contexts, and might eventually distort personal relationships.  For instance, if we ask for 
equality within the household economy, what are wives supposed to do if their husbands 
make considerably more money than they do. Are they supposed to compensate for that 
in order for there to be equality?  Are they supposed –for the sake of equality— to split 
the check when they go out for dinner?  Besides that, what does equality entail with 
respect to the activities that Pateman is talking about?  Does she mean that the same 
amount of time should be invested by the female and the male partner, for instance, in 
childrearing?  There are many cases in which that might be in fact undesirable for the 
couple.  Imagine I will defend my dissertation soon. I do not want my husband to spend 
the same amount of time than I do taking care of the children. I actually expect him to do 
more than that.  Equality is not sufficient.  Precisely because he loves me, I expect him to 
go  beyond  equality.  Furthermore,  Pateman’s  proposal  seems  to  reinforce  an 
understanding of equality that feminists appeared to be rejecting because they prefer the 
‘feminine’ ability to deal with particular (unequal) needs.
55
However, Pateman, like other feminists, implicitly appeals to those universal principles, 
as   the   fragment  quoted  above  shows.    Thus  Pateman’s   criticisms of   liberalism are 
internal, not external, critiques.
Something   similar   is   true   of   other   theorists   who   vigorously   argue   that   the 
















Feminist   theorists   claim   that   sociological   reality   does  not   fit   liberal   theory. 
More   specifically,   they   aver   that   current   facts   about   gender   are   incompatible  with 
Rawls’s theory of justice.68   Far from them being equal within society, women, they 
insist, do more housework and assume more responsibilities related to child­care than 





liberal   theory,   that   is,   its   lack of power to make reality  better.    According to most 
feminists, liberalism is not just ineffective but has had negative effects on society as 
well.69    Iris   Marion   Young   claims   that   “The   traditional   public   realm   of   universal 
citizenship [based on the modern liberal discourse of justice and rights] has operated to 
exclude  persons  associated  with   the  body  and   feelings  –especially  women,  Blacks, 
American Indians, and Jews” (1990, 97).  She also states that “The idea of the impartial 





is   consistent  with  hierarchical   authority  provided   the  authorities   act   from  impartial 
rationality.” (1990, 112).   In a very similar light, Wendy Brown states that “a liberal 
discourse of generic personhood reinscribe[s] rather than emancipate[s] us from male 
dominance” (1995,  141).     In general,   feminists   raising  this  aspect  of   the   inefficacy 




The   inefficacy   critique   is   flawed.     It   relies   on   a   serious   confusion   among 
feminist   theorists  about   the distinction between normative and descriptive claims or 
discourses,  or,   in  other  words,  between  the   role  of  philosophy and social   sciences. 















powerful   tool   actually   used   by   feminist   theorists   in   order   to   criticize   the   unjust 
conditions of current sexist and discriminatory reality.
Normative   theories   certainly   involve   some   descriptive   statements   about 
empirical realities.   Normative is not coextensive with non­empirical.   Some feminist 
theorists   are   correct   in   pointing   out   important   aspects   in   which   the   descriptive 
statements included within liberal theories are wrong.   It is thus necessary to correct 
them.  However, that does not mean that they are right in countering normative claims 




feminist   theorists   keep   confusing   them,   many   of   their   valuable   observations   about 
empirical reality will remain unarticulated within a normative discourse about what is 
just and why.





conception   of   justice   is   compatible   with   the   fact   of   reasonable   pluralism,   which 
characterizes modern democratic societies (PL xiv­xvi).   The idea of a well­ordered 























seem   to   realize   that   they   rely  on   liberal   assumptions.     Feminism  as   emancipatory 








































between   the   individual   and   his   community.75    They   were   called   ‘communitarian’ 




asocial   individualism of   liberalism;   (1.3)   its  universalistic  pretensions;  and  (1.4)   its 








































position   is  not  meant   to   imply  a  psychological  or  metaphysical   characterization  of 
human beings.   “The original position,” as observed by Mulhall and Swift, “is rather 
designed   to   model   the   normative   claim   that   it   is   appropriate   to   exclude  certain 
considerations  or   reasons when  it  comes  to  thinking about   justice”  (2003,  465,  my 
italics).
Although critics of Rawls’s TJ focus on what individuals do not know behind a 
veil   of   ignorance,   the   idea   that   in   the   original   position   individuals   do   have   some 
relevant knowledge when agreeing on principles of justice in the original position is for 






















and   values,   communitarians   maintain,   are   not   individual   but   communal. 
81 As particularly manifest in Charles Taylor’s work (Taylor 1989). 
67
Communitarians  ascribe  this  critique  to  Rawls  because of  his  contractual  approach, 
particularly because of his claim that principles of justice are the result of an agreement 




















(…).     No   doubt   even   the   concepts   that   we   use   to   describe   our   plans   and 


























(outside   the  original   position)   as  mutually  disinterested   (and  even   egoistic)   and   as 
making use of society for the pursuit of their individual advantages. Rawls designs the 
original position as he does because conceiving human beings as mutually disinterested 
is  weaker  than conceiving  them as  altruistic,  but   is  strong enough  to yield  the   two 















from TJ,  give Rawls more  to  say.    Since society  is  characterized  by a  plurality  of 
reasonable yet irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines, Rawls explicitly rejects the idea 
of a political community built around such a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or 






















































To   that   extent,   Rawls   can   argue   that   his   theory   is   culture­specific   insofar   as   it 
presupposes   a   conception   of   the   person   that   stems   from   the   political   culture   of 
constitutional democracies.  However, the fact that Rawls himself does not say that his 













as   equally   capable   of   framing   and  pursuing,   and   revising   such   conceptions 
(Mulhall and Swift 2003, 470).







to  multiple   societies  each  with  different  cultures   and  traditions,  Rawls   is   explicitly 
dealing with the problems of a multicultural society, that is, one society where multiple 
cultural   traditions   coexist.     Multiculturalism   constitutes   nowadays   the   specific 
particularity of democratic societies.
1.4 Neutrality





towards   competing   conceptions   of   the   good   is   incoherent.     Such   neutrality   is 
























Moreover,   PL   gives   Rawls   more   to   say   against   the   charge   that   liberalism 
smuggles one particular view of the good under the cover of the right, thereby proving 
not  neutral  against  other conceptions of  the good.    While  Rawls was guilty  of   that 
charge insofar he espoused comprehensive liberalism in TJ, he released himself from it 
by moving to purely political liberalism.   The five ideas of the good listed above are 
therefore   strictly  political  values   that,   on   the  one  hand,  only  apply   to   the  political 
















I  shall  consider  now the communitarian  claim that   the  state’s  neutrality will 
have “undesirable consequences” insofar as some practices will not survive without the 
promotion of the state.  In TJ, Rawls does not deny the possibility of supporting the arts 
and   the   sciences.   In   fact,   he   allows   for   a   possible   branch   of   the  government,   the 
“exchange branch,” that can provide for such activities if there is support for them and 
for the costs they represent (TJ 248­9).   He adds however that, “while the claims of 














































they   realized   that,   as   showed   above,   Rawls   is   not   susceptible   to   their   criticisms, 
particularly after the publication of PL.  On the other hand they admitted that their own 
critical approach was vulnerable to different problems, and thus did not even constitute 
a   desirable   alternative   to   liberalism.     As   pointed   out   by   Daniel   Bell,   “1980s 
communitarian theorists were less than successful at putting forward attractive visions 
of non­liberal  societies,” thereby losing credibility  (Bell  2004).   Their  ill­suited and 
unfortunate   examples   include   intimate   pre­modern   local   communities   that   prove 
manifestly   implausible   given   the   complexity   and   scale   of   contemporary   societies 
(MacIntyre 1984), and the Indian caste with integrated and hierarchical social meanings 










of   cultural   differences.     Both   feminist   theorists   who   initially   celebrated   the 







multiple   cultural   traditions   and   shared   goals   and   values   coexist,   which   makes   it 
imperative to find a way to cope with competing traditions.   Probably for this reason 
communitarians   do   not   seriously   attempt   to   overturn   the   liberal   political   agenda 
anymore. 
Yet communitarians also found another type of problems in their own critique of 
liberalism.    Walzer,   for   instance,  observed   that   the  different   communitarian  claims 
were, as presented, mutually inconsistent (Walzer 1990).   Says Walzer, “The problem 









community   and   their   moral   culture,   so   that   such   world   is   characterized   by 
fragmentation, incoherence and loss of narrative capacity (MacIntyre 1984).  However, 
if society is in fact like that, then it seems that liberalism constitutes the best way to deal 
with   it.     As   Walzer   puts   it   rephrasing   Sandel:   “If   we   really   are   a   community   of 
strangers, how can we do anything else but put justice first?” (Walzer 1990, 9)
The   second   communitarian   critique   holds   that   political   theory   radically 
misrepresents social life.   The world is not constituted of unencumbered individuals; 








are   only  partially  right.     It   is   to   some   extent   right   that   life   at   liberal   societies   is 
characterized   by   different   types   of   mobilities   that   have   countercommunitarian 
consequences. Yet this fact does not cause social incoherence, as for instance suggested 
by  MacIntyre   (1984).    To   the  extent   that  we  are   “creatures   of   community,”   these 
mobilities   do  not   get   to  move  us   apart   from each  other   to   the  point   that  we   still 
understand   and   maintain   the   ties   that   bind   us   together.     Furthermore,   Walzer 




































or,   to   appropriate   the   well­known   phrase   of   Michael   Oakeshott,   a   pursuit   of   the 
intimations of community within them” (1990, 15).
Yet Walzer goes even beyond than that.   He explicitly agrees (against his own 




seen   the  need   to  qualify   their  views,   and   in  particular   to  move  away   from overly 
simplistic   dichotomies   in   which   their   critique   of   liberalism   was   originally   framed. 
Those dichotomies have been extensively criticized by Gutmann (1985) and also by 
communitarians   (Walzer  1990,  Sandel  1998).    Sandel’s  critique  led  to   the  point  of 
claiming that he does not always find himself in the communitarian side of the debate 
between liberals and communitarians:


































Sandel   specifies   that   the  priority  of   the   right  over   the  good   stands   for   two 



















good   is   however   still   problematic   for   Sandel.     According   to   Rawls,   the   fact   of 







not  always reasonable  to set  aside claims arising from comprehensive doctrines  for 
political  purposes.    Sometimes political  agreement  on ‘grave moral  questions’  does 
depend on  the truth of   the contending doctrines.    Second,  while  there  is  a  “fact  of 
reasonable pluralism” about  the good,  there  is also a “fact of reasonable pluralism” 
about   justice   in contemporary societies.    Third,   the Rawlsian  idea of  public   reason 
according to which citizens cannot include claims from their comprehensive doctrines 

















observes,   that   comprehensive   doctrines   and   political   values   have   different   subject 
matters, for Rawls himself acknowledges that they might conflict, as they in fact do in 
the contemporary debate over abortion rights,  and  the Lincoln­Douglas debate  over 
slavery, both of which Sandel discusses (Sandel 1998, 197­202).
As for the debate over abortion, Sandel maintains that it only makes sense to 















of  their religious convictions, unlike, for  instance,  the claim that ‘abortion is wrong 
because the Vatican says so,’ with which only Catholics would agree.  Certainly, an idea 
on which  we can  expect  others to  agree is  not  an  idea on which every citizen will 
necessarily agree.  We might still reasonably disagree about it and consider different sorts 
of possible evidence for or against it.96  Or we might, no matter what our position with 
respect to the claim that fetuses are persons is, produce and argument for abortion in 
which such a claim is not relevant (for instance, Judith Jarvis Thomson’s in Thomson 





While this may not be clear enough in PL, it is certainly obvious in later writings 
when Rawls includes the “proviso” to his account of public reason, developing what has 
been called the “wide view of public reason.”  Says Rawls,  “reasonable such doctrines 
can be introduced in public reason at any time provided that in due course public reasons, 
given by  a  reasonable  conception,  are  presented sufficient  to  support  whatever  the 
comprehensive doctrines are introduced to support” (Intro li-lii).97  This wide view of 
public  reason presupposes  a  greater  role  attributed  to  the  comprehensive doctrines. 
However, this is not a substantive addition but merely a formalistic one, because elements 
of comprehensive doctrines can only be introduced qua ideas supported by the liberal 
political conception.  The mere fact that these ideas belong to a particular comprehensive 
doctrine is thus not relevant, as clear in the following fragment: 
Any comprehensive doctrine, religious or secular, can  be introduced into any 
political argument at any time, but I argue that people who do this should also 
present what they believe are public reasons for their argument.  So their opinion 
is no longer that of one particular party, but an opinion that all members of a 
society might  reasonably  agree  to,  not  necessarily that  they  would  agree  to. 
What’s important is the people give the kinds of reasons that can be understood 
and appraised  apart from their particular comprehensive doctrine (CP 619, my 
emphasis).
To the extent that the proviso does not constitute a substantive addition, it makes 
sense to argue that my reply to Sandel can be developed based on PL.98  Sandel is 
therefore wrong with respect to what bracketing moral questions implies.  The claim that 
97 See also IPRR 776 and CP 619.
98 Rawls acknowledges that “the introduction into public political culture of religious and 
secular doctrines, provided the proviso is met, does not change the nature and content of 
justification in public reason itself.  This justification is still given in terms of a family of 
reasonable political conceptions of justice”  (IPRR, 784).  See chapter 1 for a more com-
plete discussion of the idea of public reason and Rawls’s account of the relationship be-
tween political and non-political reasons.
91
fetuses are persons from the moment of conception can be introduced in the political 
discussion as long as it is  a claim everybody could agree on, as well as consider and 




















the  moral   evil   he   considered   it   to   be”   (Sandel   1998,   199).    According   to  Sandel, 






slavery   based   on   political   liberalism   itself.     Political   liberalism   does   not   stipulate 



















refuses   to  provide an  explicit   argument   for   the   liberal  conception of   justice  that   is 
independent   from   the   comprehensive   doctrines,   thereby   suggesting   that   political 
liberalism affirms certain principles merely on the grounds that they are shared in our 
political culture.102  Yet the position that liberal principles are affirmed just because they 
are   part   of   our   political   culture   is   problematic   for   the   same   reason   the   early 
communitarian critique of liberalism is problematic: The current political culture might 
100 See also Sandel’s discussion of his third objection, where he seems to assume that 
the   law (and   the  political  conception  of   justice   in  general)  completely   lacks  moral 



































104  This   becomes   evident   again   in   Sandel’s   discussion   of   his   third   objection.     By 
comparing the case for restrictive public reason with the case for restrictive rules of 
evidence   in   criminal   trials,   Sandel   reveals   he   is   assuming   that   there   is   merely   a 
pragmatic   reason   for   excluding   moral   considerations   from   political   debate.     His 
discussion in  terms of “costs” corroborate   this: “to assess  restrictive rules of public 
reason, we need to weight their moral and political cost against the political values they 
95






religious,  moral,   and philosophical  doctrines.    Yet,  Sandel  argues,   this   justification 








those principles, some debates do show disagreement  about  the principles of  justice 



















that.     While   agreement   on   x   is   complicated,   it   is   certainly   easier   to   obtain   than 
agreement  on x,  y,  and z.    Rawls’s contribution  is   therefore valuable  insofar  as he 
shows that such an extensive agreement is not needed in a democratic society.  And as a 
97






it  restrictive,  because it  excludes from the political  debate reasons coming from the 
comprehensive doctrines.  This objection ultimately targets the priority of the right over 
the  good.    Sandel   basically   is   reiterating   the   claims   he  had   raised  under   the   first 
objection,   which   I   have   already  discussed.    Excluding   comprehensive  doctrines   in 






























the   comprehensive   doctrines   that   liberalism   requires   us   to   set   aside   in   political 
discussions.     I  have shown in  the section “Bracketing Grave Moral  Questions”  that 
99
Sandel’s  claims about  the moral costs cannot be sustained.106   His claims about  the 
political costs are even weaker: He criticizes political liberalism on the grounds that it 
has  undesirable effects   in  society,   such as   fundamentalism.   As already mentioned, 
Sandel  certainly acknowledges that political   liberalism is not  wholly  responsible for 
them.  Yet to what extent can it be claimed at all that political liberalism is responsible 
for   those   undesirable   effects,   which   are   in   fact   illiberal   –intolerant,   narrow,   and 
fundamentalist, in Sandel’s words?  It seems that these illiberal behaviors would result 
from a poor application of political liberalism, or arise when the liberal conception of 
justice  is  not  held  with  sufficient  conviction.107   But   if   the  problem is   ‘not  enough 
political liberalism,’ to what extent can the solution be other than ‘more liberalism’? 
Certainly a ‘something other than liberalism’ solution would not make sense. 
It   is   in   fact   difficult   to   see   to   what   extent   Sandel’s   proposal   constitutes   a 
significant departure from Rawls’s theory.  To begin with, Sandel seems to assume that, 
according to Rawls’s idea of public reason, public debates are poor, so citizens lack 

















































the   ideal   constitution   must   also   remain   obscure’   (Sandel   1998,   xi,   quoting 
Aristotle 1323a14).




linking   the   right  with   the  good:  “rights  depend   for   their   justification on   the  moral 
importance of the ends they serve” (1998, xi).  It is not clear at any rate to what extent 
this way of linking the right with the good is substantially different from the second 
alternative.     According   to   the   second   alternative,   the   justification   of   rights   and 













































comprehensive   doctrines   is   also   unsatisfactory.     If   we   agree   on   a   liberal   political 
conception of justice we should at least be able to explain what the moral justification 










with   most   comprehensive   doctrines.     Political   liberalism   demands   a   great   deal   of 
sacrifice  from citizens:  They have  to respectfully put  some of   their  most  important 
views aside whenever  it   is necessary.   In order to do this, citizens need to be truly 
convinced of the moral value of  the political conception of justice.   Citizens whose 


















There   has   recently   been   a   revival   of   the   republican   tradition   in   political 
philosophy.  Republican theorists (herafter: republicans) advance a concept of freedom 
defined in terms of non­domination, which they contrast with the liberal conception of 
freedom   as   non­interference.     In   this   chapter   I   shall   argue   (in   section   2)   that 
republicanism   is   not   sufficiently   different   from   liberalism   to   count   as   a   genuine 
alternative   to  political   liberalism.    Republicanism’s  criticisms  are   therefore   internal 







Republicanism  advances  freedom  as  non-domination.   Freedom  as  non-
domination is presented as an alternative to the notions of negative and positive freedom 
described by Isaiah Berlin:  Negative freedom is absence of interference, and positive 
108
freedom is  ‘self-mastery,’ ‘self-control’  or  ‘self  determination.111  In  the  republican 
tradition  freedom is  conceived  as  absence  of  mastery  by  others,  that  is,  as  non-
domination.   Domination is  exemplified by the relation between master (dominus)  to 
servant or slave.  Non-domination hence involves a certain status of equality, which Pettit 
repeatedly depicts with te metaphor of agents being able to “look the other in the eye.”112 
It is thus not equivalent to non-interference, which is the absence of actual coercion or 
obstruction.  
Liberal freedom as non-interference and republican freedom as non-domination 
constitute different ideals according to Pettit, because interference and domination are 
“different evils” (1997, 22): It is possible to have domination without interference, as well 
as interference without domination.  An individual can be dominated by a kind master 
who does not actually interfere with his servant’s choices.  Absence of interference is not 
good enough because actual non-interference could be the lucky result of a precarious 
contingency.  Such an individual would be still exposed to the possibility of interference 
by her kind master.  If  freedom is conceived as non-domination,  this  contingency is 
avoided; the possibility of interference is ruled out by the fact that the agents are secured 
against it.  
Similarly, it is possible to undergo interference without being dominated, that is, 
without relating to anyone in the fashion of servant.  When interference is  meant to 






constitute domination.  Such is the case of the non-dominating interference of the law. 
Non-domination therefore involves not merely a capacity for interference, but a capacity 
for  non­arbitrary interference.  Yet what makes an act of interference arbitrary?  Pettit 
acknowledges that arbitrariness can be defined in a procedural and in a substantive sense. 
In the procedural sense an act is  arbitrary if  it  is  chosen (or rejected)  at  the agent’s 
pleasure, without reference to the interests of those affected.  In the substantive sense an 
act is arbitrary if it goes against the interests of the persons affected.  Pettit endorses the 
substantive sense.113  He specifies that it is at least necessary to track the relevant interests 
of the persons affected.  “My relevant interests and ideas,” Pettit explains, “will be those 
that are shared in common with others, not those that treat me as exceptional, since the 
state  is  meant to  serve others  as  well  as  me” (1997,  55-6).   Thus,  the  interference 
perpetrated by the state is non-arbitrary as long as it furthers the relevant interests shared 
by those affected.114
According to Pettit, non-domination is not merely necessary but sufficient for an 
account of freedom.  That is, in his opinion freedom can be defined exclusively as non-
domination.  This fact does not mean that non-interference is unimportant.  In Pettit’s 
view non-interference is subordinated to freedom as non-domination (1997, 75-5; 2002, 









Even if domination is the only antonym of freedom, it is still going to follow 
according to  my  analysis  that  undominating  or  nonarbitrary  interference  –in 
particular the interference suffered in living under a coercive but fair rule of law
— must count as a secondary offence against freedom.  Such a rule of law will not 
compromise freedom, in the manner of a dominating agency, but it will condition 
freedom  (…),  it  will  reduce  the  range  or  ease  with  which  people  enjoy 
undominated choice  (2002, 342; his emphasis). 
While domination alone compromises freedom, a number of factors condition it 
insofar  as  they  limit  one’s  ability  to  exercise  freedom.  The  factors that  condition 
freedom,  such  as  non-arbitrary  intentional  interferences  and  natural  obstacles,  like 
poverty, must be minimized in order for freedom to be effective (as opposed to merely 
formal).  That is, formal republican freedom requires non-domination, while effective 
republican freedom requires also the minimization of interference.  Pettit acknowledges 
that the law, and in general interference from the state, condition freedom yet do not 
compromise it (1997, 75-7).
In  contrast  with  Pettit,  Skinner  claims that  the  republican ideal  of  freedom 
involves  both non-domination  and  non-interference  as  equally  important  concerns 
(Skinner 1998, 68-9 and 83-4).  As Pettit observes (2002, 342) this disagreement is not 
substantial; it  only amounts to a different way of ranking the following four possible 
scenarios: 
1. Neither interference nor domination
2. Both interference and domination
3. Domination without interference
4. Interference without domination 
Pettit claims that the third will be worse than the fourth, while Skinner thinks that 3 and 4 
are equally bad.  Pettit claims that his way of ranking the scenarios fits better with the 












rationale   goes   like   this:   If   the   promotion   of   non­domination   requires   morally 
objectionable arrangements, then non­domination is an unattractive ideal.     However, 
the ideal of non­domination passes the test of reflective equilibrium, which means that 
the   ideal   proves   to   fit   with   our   moral   judgments.     Therefore,   the   ideal   of   non­
domination is attractive.115  
2. Does Republicanism Really Differ from Liberalism?
My major point about republicanism is that it is not sufficiently different from 
Rawls’s liberalism to count as a different kind of theory.  In particular, freedom as non-
domination does not distinguish republicanism from liberalism.  Two features have been 
115 See Pettit 1997, 102.
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introduced in order to distinguish domination from interference: (1) The  capacity for 
interference (as opposed to actual interference), and (2) the fact that the interference is 
arbitrary.  The first one articulates the possibility of domination without interference, 
while the second one articulates the possibility of interference without domination.  I shall 
first focus on (1).  
Liberals are not only concerned with actual interference but also with domination 
as potential interference.116  As observed by Dudley Knowles (1999), Erin Kelly (1999), 
John Christman (1998), and Roger Boesche (1998) liberals consider evil the possibility 
that  someone  has  the  capacity  to  interfere  with  another.117  Insofar  as  potential 
interference constitutes a threat to freedom it can be seen as a type of constraint against 
which liberals also want to protect citizens (Christman 1998, 203).  In general, the law is 
meant to guarantee that nobody has the possibility of interfering (Knowles 1999, 416, 
418).  More importantly, egalitarian liberals are clearly concerned with this aspect of 
domination  since  they  advance  “equal  freedom,”  that  is,  they  are  simultaneously 
explicitly concerned with both freedom and equality.   
Pettit insist that in order to achieve non-domination it is imperative to guarantee 
that nobody is at the mercy of the other, that is, that there is no asymmetry of status.118 









of specific actions given that a gentle master might decide not to act in ways that interfere 
with his servant and still dominate her.119  The condition in which there is no asymmetry 
of status is a condition of equality.  That is why Pettit mentions the importance of the 
strategy  of  reciprocal power  in  order  to  achieve  non-domination:  “The  strategy  of 
reciprocal power is  to make the resources of dominator and dominated  more equal” 
(1997, 67, my emphasis).  As developed in the section 1 of chapter 4 of Republicanism, 
freedom as non-domination “displays a distinctively egalitarian character” (1997, 111). 
In order to achieve non-domination it is thus necessary to guarantee equality between the 
citizens: “The equality sought required an equality before the law and before whatever 
instruments were available  for asserting people’s freedom as non-domination” (1997, 
117).  
Egalitarian liberals’ concern with equality is meant to secure that status in which, 
using Pettit’s metaphor, “everybody can look at each other in the eye”: A status of non-
domination.  Insofar as they advance freedom and equality, egalitarian liberals advance 
non-domination.  It is then not true that “the ideal [of freedom as non-domination] is 













Rawls’s egalitarian liberalism accounts better for equality insofar as it is more specific 
and details how precisely it relates to other aspects of the theory.  Pettit’s metaphor of 
“looking at each other in the eye” is too vague to bear theoretical weight.121  He certainly 
mentions that his theory is committed to structural but not to material egalitarianism; yet 
it is still not clear how these particular demands relate to other aspects of his theory, or 
why freedom as non-domination necessitates one type of equality and not the other.122  
We can  see  the desire of  liberals to  protect  people  against  domination more 
clearly  if  we  consider  Rawls’s  egalitarian  liberalism.   Non-domination  is  deeply 
embedded in the rationale of the original position.  Since behind the veil of ignorance a 
person does not know whether she may be actually interfered with or not, by necessity 
This suggests that, by having equal freedom as his main concern, Rawls and egalitarian 
liberals achieve the same than Pettit with his idea of freedom as non­domination.  

















she has to focus on the potential exposure to interference.123 Republicanism thus seems to 
collapse into liberalism.  Pettit  does not acknowledge the relevance of this  particular 
aspect of Rawls’s liberalism, although he continuously points out the similarities between 
his own theory and Rawls’s, and contrasts both with libertarianism which is the specific 











We  can  distinguish  in  any  such  case  between  the  evil  associated  with  the 
domination assumed by  the  criminal  and the distinct  evil  associated with the 
reduction of  choice by the criminal’s  interference.   While a  victim generally 
suffers reduced choice as a result of crime –say, that involved in loss of money, 
traumatisation, or physical harm— this is the sort of effect that might have come 
about as  a  result  of  an  unintended accident.  The evil  of  reduced choice  is 




exercise  of  domination  by  the  criminal;  it  is  this  evil  that  explains  why, 
intuitively, it  is  worse  to  have  one’s  choices  reduced  by  crime than  by  an 
unintended, perhaps purely natural, accident (Pettit 2002, 344, my italics). 
His discussion of these examples is not persuasive.  The evil of interference that 
the victim suffers is not merely “a reduction of choice,” as Pettit tendentiously says, but 
active coercion.  The victim was left with no choice (say, no choice to keep her money) 
and furthermore harmed by her attacker.  Hence it is not “the sort of effect that might 
have come about as a result of an unintended [perhaps purely natural] accident,” and it is 
then not clear it is not worse than the domination by the criminal.  
Besides, it is not even clear that a crime of this sort necessarily entails domination 
by the criminal.  We can conceive of a robbery in which the criminal simply takes the 
handbag of his victim and runs away, without relating to her “in the fashion of a master.” 
It seems that in order to use this example to support his claim that domination is worse 
than interference, Pettit would need to explain that more precisely as well.  At any rate, 
Pettit himself acknowledges that this difference between his version of republicanism and 
Skinner’s (which seems to be closer to liberalism) is not deep (Pettit 2002, 342).
Pettit claims that republicanism is superior to liberalism because republicanism 
is “distinctively communitarian” (1997, 110).   Pettit does not mean that republicanism 
amounts  to communitarianism, understood as  the contemporary political  theory pro-
posed by Michael Walzer, Alaisdair McIntyre, Charles Taylor,  and Michael Sandel. 











































































3. Arbitrariness, Paternalism, and Domination Coming from the State 













them (Meyerson 174)  he clearly  opts   for   the substantive sense,  according  to  which 
interference   is  arbitrary   if   it   fails   to   track   the   relevant   ideas  and   interests  of   those 
subject   to   it.     Pettit’s   definition   of   arbitrary   interference   rests   on   the   following 
assumptions: First, that it is possible to track the relevant ideas and interests of those 
affected by the interference, namely the citizens.  Second, that those affected (again, the 















justified   because   it   does   not   constitute   domination.129    First   of   all,   we   can   easily 
conceive of cases that would be unanimously considered instances of domination, in 
which   the   dominated   party   believes   that   such   interference   is   in   her   best   interest. 
Traditional  gender­based  domination,   as  well   as   numerous   cases  of   ethnicity­based 
domination (clearly in countries with a colonial background) follow that pattern.   The 






live whether or not  I  hold onto my wallet.   (…)    [T]he question  is  not  whether  the 
citizen’s interests were taken into account but whether they were taken into account 
properly  and according to  just procedures” (1989, 205, his italics).   Freedom as non­
domination, Christman argues, is then not the ‘supreme political value’ of a just society 
as Pettit claims: “the protection of freedom cannot be the most basic principle of justice, 




















that   the interests  that  are being promoted are  those that everyone would identify as 
relevant?   How do we guarantee that the interest is not sectional or factional?   Pettit 









themselves   (1997,  60).    This   is  a  damaging admission because  if   some  individuals 
cannot speak for themselves and be in fact dominated, then it seems that it is not true 




















track the ideas and interests of  the citizens makes it  even easier:  Groups advancing 
sectional or factional interests will conceal their domination by claiming that they are in 
fact furthering the interests of the citizenry.  Pettit’s republicanism cannot prevent this 
type   of   scenario;   there   is   no   recourse   in   his   theory   to   rule   it   out.     He   certainly 
acknowledges the possibility of the state threatening freedom as non­domination: “as a 









I am not criticizing Pettit on the grounds that the state might actually dominate its 
citizens.  Rather my criticism is that he does not clarify the limits of the state action on a 
moral basis.  No theory of ethics or political philosophy can be considered at fault if the 
agents (individually or collectively) do what they morally ought not to do.  No normative 
account can prevent that.  Normative theories (about what subjects ought to do) are not 
proven wrong because subjects fail to do what they ought to do.132  The problem I am 








































































Moreover,   republicanism’s   consequentialism   can   actually   work  against  the 
concerns   that   the   republican   language   allegedly   can   articulate.     If   non­domination 
works as a goal and not as a constraint, as Pettit has argued, it can be the case that the 
best   way   of   advancing   non­domination   conflicts   with   some   of   the   causes   that 










overridden in view of “some greater goal.”   And that is not  because of  liberalism’s 


























as   non­domination.     Furthermore,   like   republican   theorists,   egalitarian   liberals   are 
strongly committed to advancing non­domination by securing equality not just in the 
political sense but also in the socio economic one.
Is republicanism’s critique merely that   liberalism lacks an “umbrella  notion” 
that   integrates freedom with equality?   If   that  is   the case,  then it  seems that  this  is 
















that   any   sort  of   state   interference  counts   as   reducing   freedom,   republicans  do  not. 
Given that the laws and state interventions are non­arbitrary, according to republicans 
they do not reduce the citizens’ freedom.   They even make their freedom possible.141 











complex   account   of   freedom.     Freedom   involves   different   levels,   as   for   instance 
suggested in the two principles of justice.  
At   any   rate,   Pettit   still   acknowledges   that,   on   the   one   hand,   according   to 
republican theory even the non­arbitrary interference of the law  conditions  freedom, 
that is, “law restricts choice, but nonetheless (…) it does not offend straightforwardly 










for   it   is   the  absence  of  something,  namely,  of  domination.    Such negative freedom 
seems  to call   for  a  deontological  account.    Given  that   the protection of   individuals 
against  domination constitutes  the most   important  concern of  republican  thinkers,   it 
134
seems that a deontological account would be crucial: A deontological account would 
guarantee   that  nothing  (not  even a  “greater  goal”)  overrides   the  protection of  each 
individual.     Even   if   consequentialism   makes   domination   improbable,   as   Pettit 





Although   Pettit   gives   the   impression   that   republicanism   is   intrinsically 
consequentialist, it is not.  The consequentialist framework of Pettit’s theory is his own 
contribution   to   republican   tradition.     Neither   the   classical   and   modern   republican 
















possible   to   do   away   with   Pettit’s   consequentialist   framework,   thereby   certainly 
removing some problems of his theory while, by the same token, making the difference 
between republicanism and liberalism even less substantial.  However, that would still 















Feminist   theory,   communitarianism,   and   republicanism   have   unsuccessfully 
tried   to  provide with  alternatives   to  political   liberalism.    While   in  most  cases   they 
present themselves as external critiques of liberalism, they ultimately rely on liberal 
principles.     They   are   therefore   internal   critiques   that   aim   at   correcting   political 
liberalism’s theory.   The analysis of their critiques has however shown that there are 

















afterward   discuss   Charles   Larmore’s   proposal   for   a   moral   foundation   for   political 


















the   liberal   conception  of   justice   that  guarantees   the   freedom and  equality  of   every 
person is  the idea that  this conception prevails over the comprehensive doctrines in 



































argued   in   the   first   chapter   (section   “The   Reasonable”)   that   the   reasonable   is 




Why   then  did  Rawls   introduce   this   redundant   notion   in   the   first   place?     It 
certainly sounds arrogant to claim that only liberal views are reasonable.  But I do not 
think this is the most important reason for introducing the notion of the ‘reasonable.’  I 























Rawls   claims   belong   to   the   application  of   the   theory   (and  not   to   its   justification) 
actually belong to it.   For instance, as mentioned in chapters 1 and 2, the overlapping 
















Rawls’s answer to this question is not sufficiently specific.  Clarifying the boundaries of 
the political will help to develop a satisfactory account on the relationship between the 
political conception of justice and reasonable / liberal comprehensive doctrines, and thus 
address the  potential discontinuity  between  our  political  and  non-political lives that 
political liberalism endorses. 
While Rawls’s distinction between the political and the non-political is in general 
terms correct,  it  is too simple.   It  has been wrongly interpreted as implying that the 
political conception of justice simply does not operate in the non-political realm.147  The 
theory needs to be expanded in order to clarify how exactly the political conception 
operates in the non-political; for instance, how far does it go in prohibiting inequalities or 
unjust behaviors?  Clarifying how the political conception operates in the non-political 
will require analyzing the realm of the social, which in Rawls’s design falls entirely 
within  the  wide  and  indistinct  non-political  realm.   This  addition  to  the  theory  is, 
however, not meant to broaden the scope of the political, or to dispose of the distinction 
between the political and the non-political, on which I think Rawls is right.  A proper 
account of the political sphere needs also to fit with our actual experience as citizens, 
which has recently been severely transformed by the media and the internet.  Political 
147 For instance, by feminist theorists and communitarians.
143
liberalism can no longer ignore the fact that the borders between the political and the non-
political (and perhaps even more specifically, the public and the private) are now blurring 
dramatically in a way unforeseen before.  This fact accentuates the importance of the 











Political   liberalism requires citizens to converge on  the following principles. 





ensure   for   all   citizens   adequate   means   to  make   effective   use   of   their   freedoms.148 
Furthermore, these liberal principles (a), (b), and (c) are purely political.  That is, first, 
(d)   they   apply   to   basic   political   and   social   institutions,   that   is,   to   society’s   basic 
structure.   They are not meant to govern all aspects of life but primarily the strictly 
political ones.   This stipulation however does not mean that they do not or should not 
operate   beyond   the   purely   political   realm.     Such   an   interpretation   would   be 




behaviors   required  by   the  principles  of   justice.    To   that   extent,   the  principles   that 


































































section   suggested.     Rawls   did   not   draw   a   distinction   between   comprehensive   and 
political   liberalism   in   TJ150,   and   as   Burton   Dreben   has   pointed   out,   “it   is   not   a 






and (c)   to   the political and  the non­political   realm,  it   seems  that   the argument  that 
supports   it  needs to be  thicker  than  the argument  in support  of  political   liberalism, 
which restricts the application of (a), (b), and (c) to the political realm.  Comprehensive 








justification   appeals   to   substantial   notions   that,   if   accepted,   will   have   great 
repercussions in our moral (non­political) life.  In other words, the notions involved in 






therefore   said   that   comprehensive   liberalism   in   TJ   deals   with   “the   whole   truth.” 
Accepting   the   thick   notions   it   involves   conflicts   with   different   versions   of 
comprehensive liberalism, as well as with non­liberal comprehensive doctrines. 
In   contrast,   political   liberalism   constitutes   a   more   modest   theory   whose 
justification relies on thinner notions that are consistent with various comprehensive 
doctrines.    While   they presumably  share  some premises,   the  argument   for  political 
liberalism   would   be   independent   from   the   argument   for   comprehensive   liberalism 




















presenting   political   liberalism   in   terms   of   “truth,”   he   presents   is   in   terms   of 
“reasonableness,”  which constitutes  a  weaker   sense of   truth  that   involves  a  modest 
sense of correctness.152











political   conception   and   the   comprehensive   doctrines,   people   might   examine   their 
reasons   for   accepting   the   political   conception   of   justice.     While   presumably   the 
argument for the political conception rests on notions that are already implied in the 










because   the   liberal   political   conception   of   justice   is   grounded   on   an   independent 
argument   and   not   on   any   comprehensive   doctrine.     Unlike   in   Rawls’s   political 
































citizens converge on a political  conception that is  supported by an argument  that  is 
independent   from   their   various   comprehensive   doctrines,   public   discussion   about 
political   issues   is   indispensable   because   the   principles   that   constitute   the   political 
conception of justice include notions that are susceptible of being interpreted in various 
ways.  Even in a formulation that is considerably more detailed than the fairly general one 
that I have provided, the liberal principles would still be general; they must be because 
they are “principles.”  Moreover, in order to implement actual policies based on these 
principles  it  will  be  necessary to  discern  what  they  entail  for  specific  cases  and 
circumstances.  The political conception thus needs to be supplemented by a view of 
public reason that guides public political discussion.  Its content should be determined by 










first,  a  sound one.    While  the argument  is  necessarily a  normative one,   it  certainly 
includes premises about our empirical reality that should be true.  It is also, hopefully, a 
cogent one, that is, one that people can understand to be cogent.  
Philosophers   work   only   indirectly   in   the   application   of   political   liberalism. 















liberal   political   conception  of   justice.155    This   conception   of   justice   is   part   of   our 
tradition;   citizens  holding  various   comprehensive  doctrines   agree  on   it   for   reasons 
provided   by   their   own   comprehensive   doctrines.     The   fact   that   there   is   not   an 




Second,   the   fact   that   there   is   no   independent   argument   for   the   political 
155 Rawls states in CP 621-2: “Citizens can have their own grounding [for a liberal politi-
cal conception] in their comprehensive doctrines, whatever they happen to be.  I make a 
point in Political Liberalism of really not discussing anything, as far as I can help it, that 


















































Larmore proposes a  justification for  the principle of political neutrality.    He 
wants to avoid the justification provided by classic liberals, like Kant and Mill, which 














160  In this scenario, Larmore specifies,  “individuals who have different ideals of  the 
good life, but are roughly equal in power, may strike a bargain, according to which the 





two  norms  of   rational  dialogue  and  equal   respect.    The  norm of   rational  dialogue 
stipulates that








rule  out   resorting   to   force,   instead  of  discussion,   to   achieve  a  political   settlement” 
(1990, 348).













with   which   we   think   people   can   be   rightly   forced   to   comply,   and   non­political 
principles, which are the ones that we do not think are valid objects of enforcement.162 





(1999, 607).    He adds,  “To respect a  person as an end  is   to   insist   that  coercive or 
















































My   disagreement   with   Larmore   is   however   not   connected   to   the   norm   of 


























As   part   of   his   argument,   Larmore   distinguishes   between   political   and  non­
political principles, which is a presupposition for (d).  Since (d) states that (a), (b), and 



















(or   individualistic,   according   to   his   own   terminology).     He   certainly   sees   himself 
grounding “liberal neutrality.”  But why does Larmore look for an argument for liberal 







Larmore’s  position (unintentionally)   justifies political  libertarianism167  given that  his 
argument neither assumes nor yields the egalitarian component of liberalism.168








freedoms,   that   is,   in   order   to   fulfill   (c)   and   thereby   account   for   the   egalitarian 
























should  be  justifiable  to   each  person   as   they   are   to   us.    Yet   proving   that   political 






















The “political”   is  constituted  by  the  basic structure of  society,  which Rawls 
defines as “society’s main political, social, and economic institutions, and how they fit 
together into one unified system of social cooperation from one generation to the next” 
(PL   11).     The   basic   structure   of   society   is   the   subject   of   justice   because   of   the 
profoundness of its effects in citizens’ prospects of life.172  Says Rawls, “The role of the 
institutions that belong to the basic structure is to secure  just background conditions 

























claim   to   himself   any   benefit   to   which   another   may   not   pretend   as   well   as   he” 
(Leviathan XIII.1, A.P. Martinich’s edition). 
175  See also John Locke’s claims in  the  Second Treatise:  “A State also of  Equality, 
wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another: 































































respect   also   requires   that   these   basic   rights,   liberties,   and   opportunities   be   not 
subordinated to the general wellbeing or to private plans of life or conceptions of the 
good of other citizens, which means that they should be given priority with respect to 
the collective or  individual  claims of good,  that   is,   (b).    Finally,  equal respect also 
necessitates adequate means for all citizens to make use of their rights, liberties, and 









the  political.    Doing so would  go against   the  priority   that   individual   liberty has  as 
stipulated by (b).    This  argument,  as  well  as  (a),   (b),  and (c)   themselves,  has been 
presented in terms that are independent from any particular comprehensive doctrine, 
which means that (e) is fulfilled. 






















the   theory   “political”   is  not  only   that   it   does  not   apply   to   the  political   sphere   (in 
whatever terms that is defined), but the fact that it is presented and justified in thin 
terms.
The   liberal   political   conception   and   the   argument   in   its   support   have   been 























than what  I  have suggested here,   insofar  as he stipulates a particular condition,   the 
original position, in which parties would hypothetically agree on principles of justice. 






































while   the   original   position   serves   a   purpose   that   is   different   from   the   one   Rawls 




As   mentioned   earlier,   Rawls’s   political   liberalism   can   be   considered 
perfectionist to the extent that it included a thin theory of the good.  Since my version of 
political liberalism is thicker than Rawls’s political liberalism because it encompasses 
an   independent   argument   in   support   of   the   political   conception,   it   is   even   more 
perfectionist   than   Rawls’s.     However   my   view   is   neither   fully   perfectionist   nor 
comprehensive.
Feminist theorists and communitarians have mistakenly assumed that theories 







respect   to   views   of   the  good.    Also,   there   are   different   degrees   of   perfectionism. 
Different   theories   can   obviously   include   different   more   or   less   complete 




While a mere charge of perfectionism would be trivial,   it  seems that  a non­
trivial  objection  can  be   raised.    Political   liberalism’s  view   that   the   state   is  neutral 
towards   (liberal)   comprehensive   doctrines   seems   to   suggest   that   the   state   cannot 
legitimately  promote  one  of   these  comprehensive  doctrines  over  others.    However, 









liberal   also  with   respect   to   the  non­political.    For instance,  as  part  of  the  political 
education  of future citizens,  it  will  be necessary to familiarize them with the liberal 
political conception as well as with the argument in its support.  As a result  of such 
education, it is then plausible that those future citizens end up developing the political 
conception into comprehensive liberalism, that is, being liberal both with respect to the 




then   object   that   political   liberals   do   not   genuinely   accept  various  comprehensive 

















expected to transform into comprehensive liberalism.
The political conception in fact requires a lot from the comprehensive doctrines. 
Its impact on the comprehensive doctrines is both synchronic and diachronic.187   It is 
diachronic because  it seems to be, at least in the long run, powerful enough to affect 
comprehensive doctrines, at least as a result of education.  Synchronically, the political 
conception  also  affects   the  comprehensive  doctrines   insofar   as   the  demands  of   the 
political conception invariably supersede the demands of the comprehensive doctrines. 





conception,   and   this   conviction   is  more   likely   to   occur   if   there   is   an   independent 
187  In Law of Peoples, Rawls discusses says how liberal societies can over time shape 
non­liberal   societies.    His  discussion   is  however  very  different   from  the  one   I   am 
pursuing here.   Rawls maintains  that   the liberal political  conception might (through 
sanctions or otherwise) gradually change other non­liberal conceptions.   While he is 
dealing with the influence of liberal political conceptions on non­liberal conceptions, I 
am   considering   here   the   impact   of   the   liberal   political   conception   on   non­liberal 
comprehensive doctrines, that is, whether citizens that already hold a liberal political 






















Second,  even  if  it  turns  out  that  in  the  long  term  all  citizens  endorse 
comprehensive liberalism, that does not mean that the political conception should become 
182
thicker.  Since the reasons for supporting political liberalism are essentially moral and not 
pragmatic, the fact that there is a consensus on comprehensive liberalism does not justify 
expanding the political conception,  because the reasons for having a  strictly political 
conception were not based on an agreement in the first place, but on an independent 
argument in  support  of  such  conception.   In  other  words, political liberalism is  not 
contingent on  the  circumstances, but  justified  on  moral grounds.   The  fact  that  the 
circumstances change is then not a justification for getting rid of  political liberalism. 
Moreover, as said in the first chapter, comprehensive doctrines are fifth wheels.  It is 
irrelevant whether citizens are liberal with respect to the non-political; all that matters is 
that they are liberal with respect to the political.  The political liberal conception should 
still be presented and justified by appealing to thin notions that are consistent with various 
liberal doctrines, whether in the political or the comprehensive sense.
5.   Final Remarks
The articulation of Rawls’s ideas in terms of an independent argument for the 
liberal  political   conception   improves   the   theory   insofar   as   the  problems  mentioned 
above will be solved.   The general account of political liberalism I have presented is 
certainly still incomplete.   For instance, a detailed account of what equality demands 
will   illuminate   exactly   how   inclusive   the   political   sphere   ought   to   be,   that   is, 
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